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Economic Vulnerability and Severity of Debt Problems: An Analysis of the 
Irish EU-SILC 2008 
In this paper, using Ireland, where debt issues are of particular salience as a test case, we seek 
to understand the extent to which the measures currently employed as national indicators of 
poverty  and  social  exclusion  succeed  in  capturing  over-indebtedness  and,  more  broadly, 
severity  of  debt  problems.  Our  analysis  reveals  a  clear  gradient  with  predictive  ability 
increasing sharply as one moves from ‘at risk of poverty’ to consistent poverty and finally 
economic vulnerability indicators. In relation to debt problems, the key distinction is between 
the  just  under  one  in  five  households  defined  as  economically  vulnerable  and  all  others. 
Financial exclusion, relating to access to a bank account and a credit card, was found to 
increase  debt  levels.  However,  such  effects  were  modest.  The  impact  of  economic 
vulnerability seems to be largely a consequence of its relationship to a wide range of socio-
economic attributes and circumstances. The manner in which a potential debt crisis unfolds 
will be shaped by the broader socio-economic structuring of life-chances. Any attempt to 
respond to such problems by concentrating on household behaviour or, indeed, triggering 
factors without taking the wider social structuring of economic vulnerability is likely to  be 
both seriously misguided and largely ineffective, 




Economic Vulnerability and Severity of Debt Problems: An Analysis of 
the Irish EU-SILC 2008  
Introduction 
In this paper, using Ireland, where debt issues are of particular salience as a test case, we seek 
to understand the extent to which the measures currently employed as national indicators of 
poverty  and  social  exclusion  succeed  in  capturing  over-indebtedness  and,  more  broadly, 
severity of debt problems. Over-indebtedness and related debt problems are by no means new 
phenomena.  However  the  rapid  rise  in  personal  debt  and  consumer  credit  from  the  mid 
1990’s  to  2008  followed  by  the  precipitous  economic  crash  has  made  these  issues 
increasingly pertinent. Rapidly increasing house prices, low interest rates and an expanding 
credit market resulted in a dramatic increase in the use of credit in Ireland and elsewhere. The 
level of mortgage lending per capita increased tenfold over the period 1995 to 2008, the level 
of credit card debt per capita rose by just under 700% (Central Bank 2005 and 2010) and the 
ratio  of  household  debt  to  disposable  income  rose  by  270%  between  1995  and  2008 
(Oireachtas Library & Research Service 2010). The growing interest amongst the relevant 
stake-holders in Ireland is evidenced by the formation of the number of high level policy 
groups and the publication of relevant reports by a number of national agencies. This list 
includes the Expert Group on Mortgage Arrears which published its final report in November 
2010, as well as the recent publications by the Law Reform Commission on personal debt 
management and debt enforcement (LRC 2009, 2010 a, b) and the Free Legal Aid Centres 
report on debtors experiences in the Irish legal system (FLAC 2009).  
Setting  the  experience  of  arrears  and  indebtedness  in  a  macro-economic  context,  recent 
European  statistics  show  that  across  the  whole  of  Europe  the  overall  level  of  household 
indebtedness is rising dramatically. Expressed as a ratio of household financial liabilities to 2 
 
national GDP, in some countries the debt level has reached level well above 100 per cent of 
GDP. In Ireland it reached 113% in 2008, one of the highest levels in Europe after Denmark 
(144%)  and  the  Netherlands  (121%)  (Russell  et  al  2010).  Not  only  is  the  importance  of 
household  debt  rising  in  the  economy  as  a  whole,  but  also  within  households’  personal 
financial portfolios. Recent figures from the OECD showed that for many European countries 
household debt as a percentage of household disposable income has risen consistently since 
the mid nineties (OECD, 2006).  
This paper draws on the Irish component of the European Union Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions (EU-SILC) which was carried out by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) in 
2008 which provides much needed evidence on these issues. Our analysis will incorporate 
discussion  of  over-indebtedness  but  our  focus  is  not  primarily  on  the  issues  involved  in 
establishing  such  a  dichotomy  but  rather  with  the  factors  influencing  severity  of  debt  as 
captured by the use of multiple indicators. Our primary focus is on an assessment of which 
indicators of poverty and social exclusion succeed in capturing both over-indebtedness and 
severity of debt problems. In so doing we also seek to place the increasing scale and severity 
of debt problems in a wider socio-economic context. 
EU-SILC 2008 
 In Ireland, the information required under the EU-SILC framework is obtained via a survey 
conducted by the Central Statistics Office each year. The EU-SILC survey is a voluntary 
random survey of private households. For this paper we use the EU-SILC 2008. In 2008, the 
total completed sample size was 5,247 households and 12,551 individuals. (for further details 
of the survey see CSO, 2009). In 2008 a special module was added on over-indebtedness and 
financial exclusion. 3 
 
In  this  paper  our  analysis  is  conducted  at  household  level.  However,  consistent  with 
conventional  practice  poverty  and  economic  vulnerability  outcomes  have  been  initially 
assigned to individuals and household outcomes have been determined on the basis of the 
corresponding values for the Household Reference person (HRP). The HRP is the person 
responsible for the accommodation or the older of such person where more than one person is 
involved. 
We make use of three measures of poverty and social exclusion that have previously been 
developed in Ireland employing the Irish component of the ECHP and EU-SILC.  These 
comprise the “at risk of poverty” measure, the consistent poverty indicator and a measure of 
“economic vulnerability”. 
The  “at  risk  of  poverty”  indicator  identifies  the  proportion  of  the  population  with  an 
equivalised  household  income  below  a  certain  percentage  of  the  median  income. 
Conventionally  the  income  poverty  threshold  is  drawn  at  60%  of  median  income.  This 
measure is used in the Irish National Action Plan for Social Inclusion in Ireland and is also 
one of the key “Laeken indicators” devised to study poverty across Europe. 
The consistent poverty indicator measures the proportion of the population that is “at risk of 
poverty”  and  living  in  a  household  lacking  two  or  more  items  of  a  set  of  eleven  basic 
deprivation items. These items can be divided into two groups. In the first group it contains 
items that are regarded as basic goods such as food, clothing or heat. The second group 
includes items relating to participation in family and social life such as buying presents for 
family or socialising with friends (Whelan et al 2006 and Whelan, 2007). This measure has 
been employed as the basis of  the official national poverty target in Ireland. 
The economic vulnerability measure is derived from a latent class analysis involving a set of 
four  categories  of  income  poverty,  the  dichotomised  version  of  the  eleven  item  basic 4 
 
deprivation index and a measure of subjective economic stress that differentiates between 
those  living  in  households  experiencing  “great  difficulty”  or  “difficulty”  in  making  ends 
meet. The analysis seeks to identify a cluster of vulnerable individuals who are characterised 
by a multidimensional profile relating to these three indicators that involves a heightened 
level of risk that sets them apart from the remainder of the population. The contrast between 
clusters is in terms of risk profiles rather than current patterns of disadvantage. The patterns 
of  differentiation  between  the  economically  vulnerable  and  non  vulnerable,  in  terms  of 
relative risks of experiencing each of the three forms of disadvantage included are set out in a 
graphic  summary  in  Figure  1.  Focusing  first  on  income  poverty  we  see  that  economic 
vulnerability carries a risk of 33.2 per cent of being found below the 60% of median income 
threshold compared to 10.0 per cent for the non-vulnerable (the corresponding figures for the 
50% line are 16.5 and 5.9 per cent and for the 70% line 59.9 and 17.8 per cent). In each case 
the disparity between the two classes is approximately 3:1. The contrasts are even sharper in 
relation to the remaining elements. For economic stress the figures are 80.1 and 10.9 per cent 
and for basic deprivation 0.8 and 69.1 per cent (Whelan and Maître, 2010). 
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Defining and Measuring Over-indebtedness and Severity of Economic Debt 
While there is an agreement that debt levels have substantially increased, there has been less 
consensus  on  how  over-indebtedness  has  been  defined  and  measured.  Furthermore,  it  is 
widely recognised that the concept of over-indebtedness is multi-dimensional and therefore 
no one single indicator can encapsulate it. It is possible to identify three broad models for 
measuring consumer over-indebtedness (Ferreira 2000; Finlay 2006 and Betti et al 2007).  
The first is an objective, quantitative model based on the notion of unsustainable spending 
behaviour  (consumption/income  ratio)  or  unsustainable  level  of  debt  (debt/asset  ratio)  or 
inability  to  service  debt  (debt  payment/income  ratio).    However,  there  is  no  established 
methodology  for  determining  the  critical  level  of  these  ratios.    Furthermore,  Betti  et  al. 
(2007) argue that even if a critical level of indebtedness can be established it is likely to 
fluctuate widely through the life cycle of an individual. 
A second model is a subjective model that classifies as  over-indebted all those who judge 
themselves to be unable to repay their debts without reducing their other expenditure below 
their normal minimal levels, therefore the debt has become unsustainable. Within this model 
over-indebted  households  are  identified  as  those  that  express  ‘difficulty’  or  ‘serious 
difficulty’  in  making  debt  payments,  including  credit  debt,  mortgage  payments  and  hire 
purchase instalments. One difficulty with this measure is that tolerance for debt may vary 
across countries and time and therefore may be an unstable indicator if used in isolation. 
The administrative model records as over-indebted all those cases of non-payments of debt 
that have been officially registered or declared before a court. As the point of reference is 
often bankruptcy or court proceedings, it can be regarded as a measure of the outcome rather 
than the experience of indebtedness (Betti et al. 2007). 6 
 
Responding to such disparity, a consortium of researchers was appointed by the European 
Commission  to  develop  a  common  operational  definition  of  over-indebtedness.  The 
indicators proposed by Davydoff et al (2008: 55-56) are a mix of both the objective and 
subjective  models.  Indicators  of  over-indebtedness  include  payment  commitments  which 
push the household below the poverty threshold, structural arrears on at least one financial 
commitment, a burden of monthly commitment payments considered to be heavy for the 
household, limited payment capacity and illiquidity. Households who meet all the criteria are 
considered  over-indebted.  Households  that  fulfil  all  the  criteria  but  whose  income  is  not 
reduced  below  the  poverty  threshold  are  considered  to  be  ‘at  risk’  of  over-indebtedness 
(Davydoff et al 2008). 
In this paper, employing data from the EU-SILC 2008 special module, we adopt three of the 
five measures recommended by the group:  
·  Structural arrears (being in arrears more than once in the last 12 months) on at 
least one financial commitment. Information on four types of credit commitments 
and bills are included: mortgage/rent, utilities, loan repayments and other bills. 
Outstanding  credit  card  debts  and  overdrafts  are  not  included  as  there  is 
inadequate information on the persistence of these forms of debt.  
·  Burden  of  monthly  commitment  payments  (housing  costs  including  mortgage 
payments or rent; and/or re-payment of other loans) are considered to be a heavy 
burden for the household. 
·  Illiquidity (an inability to meet an unexpected expense). 
 
Russell et al (2011) define households that fulfil all three criteria as over-indebted. 7 
 
Over-indebtedness and Severity of Debt by Income Poverty, 
Consistent Poverty 
Our initial analysis focuses on the individual elements of the over-indebtedness. In Table 1 
we show the breakdown of experiencing persistent arrears by income  poverty, consistent 
poverty and economic vulnerability. Just less than 15 per cent of households fall below the 
60% of median income poverty threshold.  The risk of persistent arrears for such households 
is 15 per  cent  compared to just over 6 per cent for the non-poor. For the 4 per cent of 
households that are consistently poor the contrast is sharper with the respective figures being 
6.3 and 37.2. The proportion in persistent arrears increases from below 3 per cent for the non-
vulnerable cluster to 30 per cent for the vulnerable. The odds ratio showing the odds of 
experiencing persistent arrears rise from 2.6 for “at risk of poverty” to 6.3 in relation to 
consistent poverty and finally to 15.4 for economic vulnerability. It is to be expected that the 
contrast is greater for consistent poverty than income poverty since the former are a sub-
group of the latter identified on the basis of being above the basic deprivation threshold. 
However, the vulnerable cluster represents almost 18 per cent of households but the odds 
ratio associated with this dichotomy prove to be the most striking. This is true despite the fact 
that the consistently poor group also constitutes a sub-set of the vulnerable cluster. This arises 
because while the level of persistence of arrears is higher for the consistently poor households 
than for the vulnerable, the rate is substantially lower for the non-vulnerable than for those 
not  exposed  to  consistent  poverty.  The  vulnerability  measure  is  more  successful  in 
identifying  household  experiencing  persistent  arrears  not  because  it  focuses  on  a  smaller 
group but because it succeeds in identifying a group of households that, in important respects, 




Table 1: Persistent Arrears by At Risk of Poverty, Consistent Poverty & Economic 
Vulnerability 
  %    % of Households 
At Risk of Poverty at 60% of median     
No      6.3%   
Yes  15.0  14.6 
Odds ratio  2.624   
     
Consistent Poverty     
No   6.3   
Yes  37.2  4.3 
Odds ratio  8.811   
     
Economic Vulnerability     
No   2.7   
Yes  30.0  17.8 
Odds ratio  15,447   
 
A similar pattern is observed in relation to the burden of monthly commitments as can be 
seen from Table 2. Almost 40 per cent of income poor households compared to just over 20 
per cent of non-poor households report an undue burden of commitments producing an odds 
ratio of 2.3. For consistent poverty the respective percentages are 22 and 67 leading to an 
odds ratio of 7.1. Finally for economic vulnerability the relevant percentages are 14 and 67 









Table 2: Burden of Monthly Commitments by At Risk of Poverty, Consistent Poverty & Economic 
Vulnerability 
  %   
At Risk of Poverty at 60% of 
median 
 
No   21.3 
Yes  38.5 
Odds ratio  2.31 
   
Consistent Poverty   
No   21.9 
Yes  66.5 
Odds ratio  7.079 
   
Economic Vulnerability   
No   14.2 
Yes  67.4 
Odds ratio  11.994 
 
The  pattern  for  illiquidity  is  somewhat  different  as  can  be  seen  from  Table  3.  Among 
households experiencing income poverty 67 per cent report such difficulties but this figure is 
almost  halved  for  the  non-poor.  The  resulting  odds  ratio  has  a  value  of  3.7.  For  the 
vulnerability dichotomy the respective percentages are 30 and 91 giving an odds ratio of 22.3. 
For all three items economic vulnerability produces much sharper differentiation than income 
poverty. However, in this case the highest odds ratio is actually associated with consistent 
poverty. This arises because almost all of the consistent poor report such difficulties with the 
figure reaching 98.4 per cent compared to 38.2 for the non-poor. The resultant odds ratio 






Table 3: Illiquidity by At Risk of Poverty, Consistent Poverty & Economic Vulnerability 
  %   
At Risk of Poverty at 60% of median   
No   36.3 
Yes  67.3 
Odds ratio  3.655 
   
Consistent Poverty   
No   38.2 
Yes  98.4 
Odds ratio  99.015 
   
Economic Vulnerability   
No   29.9 
Yes  90.5 
Odds ratio  22.329 
 
In Table 4 we combine the three items in order to consider both level of over-indebtedness 
and severity of debt problems. Just less than one in two households report at least one debt 
problem, 28 per cent report only one problem and half as many report two problems. Finally 
5.4 per cent fulfil the three conditions set by Russell et al (2011) in order for a household to 
be counted as over-indebted. Presumably applying the five conditions proposed by Davydoff 
et al (2008) would lead to a significantly lower figure and introducing an additional income 
poverty threshold condition would reduce it even further. 
Table 4: Level of Over-Indebtedness and Severity of Debt Problems 
  % 
Severity of Debt Problems   
0  52.5 
1  28.1 
2  14.0 
3 (over- indebted)  5.4 




These findings suggest to us that restricting our focus to those fulfilling all three conditions 
may  restrict  our  ability  to  understand  the  processes  contributing  to  debt  problems.  
Consequently, in Table 5 we look at the relationship between income poverty, consistent 
poverty and economic vulnerability and debt problem scores ranging from 0 to 3. Focusing 
first on households experiencing income poverty, we find that they are twice as likely as the 
non-poor  to  fulfil  all  three  conditions  with  the  respective  percentages  being  11  and  5. 
However,  differentiation  between  the  poor  and  the  non-poor  is  not  restricted  to  this 
dichotomy. Poor households are more than twice as likely to experience problems in relation 
to  two  of  the  items  with  the  relevant  percentages  being  respectively  26  and  12.  The 
corresponding  figures  for  one  difficulty  are  38  and  27  per  cent.  Finally  the  figures  for 
experiencing at least one problem are respectively 74 and 43 per cent. These findings make 
clear that restricting our attention solely to over-indebtedness, defined in terms of meeting all 
three conditions, would give us a rather restricted view of the relationship between income 
poverty and debt problems. 
A similar picture emerges for consistent poverty, 28 per cent of such households were over-
indebted compared to only 4 per cent of the remainder. Similarly the consistently poor are 
almost  four  times  more  likely  to  report  problems  with  two  items  with  the  respective 
percentages  being  47  and  13.  Focusing  on  the  numbers  experiencing  at  least  one  debt 
problem  we  find  that  over  98  per  cent  of  the  consistently  poor  fall  into  this  category 
compared to less than 50 per cent of the remaining households. 
Finally, we look at the impact of economic vulnerability on the distribution of debt problems. 
The contrast in terms of over-indebtedness is sharper than for either of the poverty measures 
with 25 per cent of vulnerable households experiencing such difficulties compared to only 1 
per cent of other households. Similarly while 43 per cent of the former report two difficulties 12 
 
this is true of only 8 per cent of the latter. The respective figures for being exposed to at least 
one difficulty are 95 and 37 per cent. 
Table 5: Level of Over-Indebtedness and Severity of Debt Problems by At Risk of Income 
Poverty, Consistent Poverty & Economic Vulnerability 
  At Risk of Poverty  Consistent Poverty  Economic Vulnerability 
  No  Yes  No   Yes  No  Yes 
  %  %  %  %  %  % 
Severity of 
Debt Problems 
           
0  57.0  26.0  54.8  1.6  62.9  5.2 
1  26.5  37.5  28.3  23.6  28.5  26.6 
2  11.9  26.0  12.5  46.6  7.5  43.4 
3 (Over-
indebted) 
4.5  10.6  4.4  28.3  1.1  24.7 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
Analysing Socio-Economic Influences on the Severity of Debt 
Problems 
Our analysis clearly supports the argument that, if our concern is to understand the socio-
economic  differentiation  of  debt  problems,  a  focus  on  a  continuum  of  severity  of  debt 
difficulties seems more appropriate than restricting our attention to the contrast between those 
simultaneously exposed to multiple pressures. In Table 6 we show the results of a set of 
ordered logit models for the four category variable relating to severity of debt problems. The 
ordered  logit  model  assumes  parallel  slopes  for  the  J-1  cumulative  logits  that  can  be 
constructed for a variable with J categories. Focusing first on the ‘at risk of poverty’ measure 
we see that the odds ratio is 3.3 and the Nagelkerke
2 is 0.056. For consistent poverty the odds 
ratio is 12.5 and the Nagelkerke
2 is 0.085. Finally for economic vulnerability the odds ratio 
rises to 24.8 and the Nagelkerke
2 to 0.329.  Thus, consistent with our earlier discussion, we 
find  that  our  ability  to  differentiate  between  households  in  terms of the severity  of their 
exposure to debt problems increases as one moves from income poverty to consistent poverty 
and most particularly to economic vulnerability. 13 
 
 
An important question that arises is the extent to which the relationship between severity of 
debt  problems  and  economic  vulnerability  is  a  consequence  of  the  multidimensional  risk 
profile defining vulnerability or is potentially an artefact of the fact that one of the component 
elements of economic vulnerability is the item relating to the extent to which a household has 
“difficulty” or “great difficulty” in making ends meet. In order to address this question we 
create a four category variable by cross-classifying the economic vulnerability dichotomy 
with the economic stress dichotomy. This enables us to distinguish between the following 
four categories. 
·  Those  households  which  are  neither  economically  vulnerable  nor  economically 
stressed. 
·  Those stressed but not vulnerable. 
·  Those vulnerable but not stressed. 
·  Finally those which are both vulnerable and stressed. 
Table 6: Ordered Logits of Severity of Debt on Income Poverty, Consistent Poverty & 
Economic Vulnerability 
  At Risk of Poverty  Consistent Poverty  Economic 
Vulnerability 
  B  B  B 
Odds Ratio  3.254***  12.453***  24.827*** 
Reduction in Log 
Likelihood 
228,775  350.461  1,537.318 
Degrees of freedom  1  1  1 
Nagelkerke    R
2  0,056  0.085  0.329 
N  4,427  4.427  4,427 




In Table 7 we show the results of an ordered logistic regression with severity of economic 
stress as the dependent variable and a set of dummy variables capturing the impact of the 
vulnerability/stress  typology  with  the  group  that  is  neither  vulnerable  nor  stressed  as  the 
benchmark.  Compared  to  the  reference  group  we  can  see  that  the  odds  on  being  in  the 
category  experiencing  greater  severity  of  debt  problems  for  each  of  the  three  possible 
cumulative comparisons is 13.3 times higher for the group that is stressed but not vulnerable. 
It is clear that economic stress is associated with severity of debt problems even where it is 
not  accompanied  by  economic  vulnerability.  We  are  not  in  a  position  to  distinguish  the 
direction  of  causality.  However,  our  analysis  reveals  that  the  ability  of  the  economic 
vulnerability  measure  to  capture  those  experiencing  debt  problems  is  afar  form  being 
accounted for by its association with economic stress. This is clear from the fact that for those 
experiencing  economic  vulnerability but not currently reporting economic stress the odds 
ratio relative to those experiencing neither is 13.1. Finally for those households that are both 
economically vulnerable and currently experiencing economic stress, who comprise the vast 
bulk of economically vulnerable households, the odds ratio rises sharply to 58.5 It is clear 
that both economic vulnerability and current economic stress are significantly associated with 
to severity of debt problems. However, the capacity of the vulnerability measure to capture 
those experiencing debt problems cannot be accounted for simply by its association with the 
economic  stress  measure    but  rather  is  derived  from  the  multidimensional  risk  profile 






Table 7: Ordered Logit for Severity of Debt on Typology of Economic Stress & Vulnerability 
  Ordered Logit 
  Odds Ratio 
Ref. Neither Economically 
Stressed nor Vulnerable 
1.000 
Economically Stressed but 
not Vulnerable 
     13.276*** 
Vulnerable but not 
Economically Stressed 
    13.079*** 
Economically Stressed and 
Vulnerable 
   58.498*** 
Reduction in Log Likelihood  2,130.143 
Degrees of freedom  3 
Nagelkerke    R
2  0.427 
N  4.427 
     
*** p< .001 
 
Severity of Debt Problems and Financial Exclusion 
A number of commentators have linked the rapid rise in debt to changes in access to and use 
of credit, even for those on lower incomes who were traditionally excluded (Kempson 2002; 
Burton et al. 2004; Oireachtas Library & Research Service 2010). These commentators point 
out an ever-broadening range of credit available through both prime and sub-prime markets.  
In addition, due to the widespread access to prearranged lines of credit and technological 
advances,  it  has  become  easier  for  creditors  to  offer  revolving  credit  which  promotes  a 
vicious circle of indebtedness (O’Loughlin 2006).   
Some research has found higher levels of credit are linked to the experience of debt problems. 
Poppe (1999) Berthoud and Kempson (1992) and Kempson (2002) found the more credit 
commitments a household had, and the larger proportion of their income that they spent on 
repaying them, the more serious was the level of arrears/financial difficulties.  In contrast, a 
number of cross-national studies have shown that in countries where access to credit is more 
restricted, over-indebtedness appears to be more severe. For example Betti et al (2007) found 
that in Denmark where 43% households had consumer debts, 19% of these households were 16 
 
over-indebted, and in Ireland, where 29% of households had consumer debt, 25% of these 
households  were  over-indebted.  In  Greece,  in  contrast,  where  only  9%  of  households 
borrowed, 96% of these households had a serious problem with debt repayment. Betti et al 
(2007) find that high borrowing countries (such as UK, Ireland, and Denmark) tend to have 
lower  proportions  of  over-indebted  households  across  all  income  groups.  This  may  be 
because more households face a liquidity constraint in times of personal economic shocks in 
countries where consumer debt market is less liberalised (Byrne et al. 2005; Pleasence et al. 
2007; Betti et al 2007). 
1 
Financial exclusion, according to the European Commission (2008), is   
“A process whereby people encounter difficulties accessing and/or using financial services 
and products in the mainstream market that are appropriate to their needs and enable them 
to lead a normal social life in the society in which they belong.”  
In what follows we consider the extent to which financial inclusion or exclusion is related to 
severity of debt problems. However, we do not seek to distinguish between voluntary and 
compulsory exclusion. Our focus is on banking exclusion and credit exclusion. However, it 
should be noted that the EU SILC special module measures access to services but does not 
address the broader issues of how these services are used. Respondents may have access to a 
service but it may be inappropriate to their needs or they may be using it ineffectively.       
The specific items we consider include both access as such and usage and are as follows: 
·  Access to a bank current account 
·  Having access to an overdraft 
·  Likelihood of  being overdrawn due to financial difficulties (among bank account 
holders) 17 
 
·  Access to credit card 
·  Having an outstanding credit card balance 
·  Having an outstanding credit card balance (among credit card holders) 
·  Currently availing of other loans. 
In Table 8 we show the relationship between such items and economic vulnerability. The 
vulnerable  households  are  four  times  more  likely  not  to  have  a  bank  account  with  the 
respective percentages being 44 and 14. They are almost twice as likely not to have a credit 
card with the respective figures in this case being 80 per cent and 42 per cent. Given these 
figures, it is not surprising that the vulnerable are in absolute terms not more likely to have an 
overdraft or a credit card balance. For the former, the figures for the vulnerable and non- 
vulnerable respectively were 6 and 5 per cent and for the latter 7 and 9 per cent. However, 
among those with access to bank accounts and credits the risk of both overdrafts and balances 
are twice as high for the vulnerable as the non-vulnerable. For an overdraft the respective 
figures are 11 and 5 per cent and for credit card balance 32 and 16 per cent. Finally, the 
vulnerable are somewhat more likely to have other loans with the relevant figures are 38 and 
28 per cent. Credit card debt and overdraft debt seem to be qualitatively different from other 
forms of arrears. Clearly, accumulating such debt is predicated on having to such services and 
such access is significantly associated with socio-economic advantage (see Russell et al 2011, 
for further analysis of access to financial services). 
Clearly economically vulnerable households have less access to the financial system but it is 
not entirely obvious that this will impact on the severity of their debt problems. In Table 9 we 
show the distribution of debt problems broken down by possession of a bank account and a 
credit card within the vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups.  18 
 
Among non-vulnerable households we can see that possession of both a bank account and a 
credit card bears a strong negative relationship to severity of debt problems. Over two thirds 
of those non-vulnerable households with a bank account have a score of zero on the debt 
scale compared to just over one-third of those without accounts. They are half as likely to 
have scores of 1, 2 or 3 although the number in the over-indebtedness category even among 
those without bank accounts is extremely modest at 2 per cent. 
Table 8: Access to Banking and Credit and Frequency of Overdrafts and Balances by 
Economically Vulnerable 
  Vulnerable  Non-Vulnerable 
  %  % 
No Bank Account  43.5  14.4 
Bank Overdraft
1  6.2  4.5 
Bank Overdraft among Bank 
Account Holders 
11.0  5.3 
No Credit Card  79.9  42.1 
Outstanding Credit Card 
Balance 
6.5  9.4 
Outstanding Credit Card 
Balance among Credit card 
Holders 
32.3  16.2 
 
 
Other Loans  38.4  27.5 





Focusing on credit cards, we find that almost three quarters of non-vulnerable households 
possessing such cards have scores of zero on the debt scale compared to almost half those 
without such cards. They are also half as likely to have scores of 1 or 2 and are five times 
more likely to be located in the over-indebtedness category although the figure for those 
without credit cards does not rise above 2 per cent. 19 
 
Table 9: Severity of Debt by Having a Bank Account and Credit Card by Economic 
Vulnerability 
  Bank Account  Credit Card 
  No  Yes  No  Yes 
  %  %  %  % 
Non-Vulnerable         
Severity of Debt 
Problems 
       
0  36.1  67.4  49.0  73.0 
1  49.1  25.0  38.4  21.2 
2  12.8  6.6  10.4  5.4 
3 (over-
indebtedness) 
1.9  1.0  2.2  0.4 
         
Vulnerable         
Severity of Debt 
Problems 
       
0  2.9  7.0  4.6  7.6 
1  24.9  27.9  24.4  35.4 
2  45.3  42.0  43.7  42.4 
3 (over-
indebtedness) 
26.9  23.1  27.3  14.6 
 
 
Turning our attention to the vulnerable households we find that those having a bank account 
were twice as likely to have scores of zero with the respective figures being 7 per cent and 3 
per cent. For the remaining categories modest but consistent differences are observed in each 
case, for examples the figures for over-indebtedness are 23 and 27 per cent. For credit cards, 
however, the picture is nearer to that for the non-vulnerable with those with credit cards being 
only half as likely to be found in the over-indebtedness category with the observed rates 
being 15 and 27 per cent and almost twice as likely to have scores of zero – 8 versus 5 per 
cent. 
What do these finding suggest regarding the impact of financial inclusion in interaction with 
personal  characteristics  on  severity  of  debt  problems?  It  is  clear  that  such  inclusion,  as 
reflected  in  having  a  bank  account  and  a  credit  card  are  negatively  associated  with  debt 20 
 
problems for both vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups. This relationship holds even though 
it  is  true  that  where  vulnerable  households  have  bank  accounts  and  credit  cards  their 
conditional  probabilities  of  having  overdrafts  and  outstanding  balances  are  significantly 
greater. These findings provide very little support for the view that increased access to credit 
and the misuse or inefficient uses of such credit by vulnerable groups contribute in a general 
fashion to exacerbating the severity of debt problems. However, in the recent past, mortgage 
lending is almost certain to have been an exception to this conclusion and such effects will 
have  influences  on  our  debt  measure  through  the  burden  of  repayments  component.  In 
addition, we lack sufficient information on ‘unofficial’ money lending to evaluate its impact. 
Care  needs  to  be  exercised  in  interpreting  the  negative  association  between  financial 
inclusion and severity of debt problems. Such inclusion is likely to be associated with a range 
of socio-economic and personal characteristics that impact on severity of debt problems. In 
our later analysis, where we take into account such factors, we find that it is necessary to 
modify our conclusions relating to credit cards.  
Adverse Financial Shocks and Severity of Debt Problems 
Adverse financial shocks which lead to loss of income are common reasons for financial 
stress  across  a  range  of  studies.  Betti  et  al  (2007)  found  unexpected  adverse  shocks  to 
expenditure  requirements  and/or  total  resources  were  consistently  related  to  over-
indebtedness. Similarly, Herbert and Kempson (1995) found drops in income to be predictive 
of over-indebtedness independently of income per se. More recently, in a survey of over-
indebtedness in the UK, loss of income was cited by 45% of households as a reason for being 
in financial difficulties, with job loss or redundancy being cited by one in five of households 
(Kempson 2002). 21 
 
Such shocks can include not only changes in employment status, but also interest rates, the 
value of household financial and fixed assets, health, family structure and hence changes to 
both household resources and basic expenditure requirements.  For example, a number of 
studies  have  found  that  a  change  in  family  circumstances,  most  especially  relationship 
breakdown  leading  to  separation  or  divorce,  is  a  potential  trigger  for  financial  difficulty 
(Berthoud & Kempson 1992; Kempson 2002; Kempson et al 2004; Mori 2005). Other studies 
have shown that loss of income through illness, accident or disability was the explanation for 
11  per  cent  of  people  who  were  over-indebted  in  France  (Gloukoviezoff  2006  cited  in 
Davydoff et al 2008) and 6% of households with arrears in the UK (Kempson 2002).  
EU-SILC  respondents in  Ireland were asked  whether their household had experienced “a 
major  drop  in  income  in  the  past  12  months”.  Overall  19  per  cent  of  households  had 
experienced such a drop in income. This figure rose to 40 per cent for households who are 
classified as over-indebted. The survey also sheds further light on the reasons behind this 
income  drop.  Unsurprisingly,  given  the  survey  covers  the  beginning  of  the  recession  in 
Ireland, one quarter of those who experienced a drop in income said this was due to job loss 
or redundancy, this figure rose to 31% among over-indebted households.
2 A drop in hours or 
wages, which may also be linked to the economic downturn, was responsible for the income 
shock  in  17.5%  of  cases,  while  illness/disability  which  limited  a  household  member’s 
capacity to work emerged in 12% of cases overall and 19% of cases where the household was 
over-indebted. The increased household costs that come with the birth of a child (including 
reduced  earning  capacity)  discussed  in  the  literature  is  evidenced  among  the  8%  of 
households where the income drop is due to maternity/parental leave or childcare. The birth 
of children may also be picked up in the “other changes in household composition” category, 
which was given as a reason for a major drop in income by 8% of respondents (12% among 
over- indebted household). Relationship breakdown was mentioned in 2% of cases. 22 
 
Vulnerable households were over twice as likely to have experienced an adverse income as 
their non-vulnerable counterparts with the respective figures being 33 and 16 per cent. They 
were also almost twice as likely to expect that their financial situation would get worse with 
the respective figures being 33 and 19 per cent. In Table 10 we look at the impact of an 
income shock taking into account the impact of economic vulnerability. Having controlled 
for economic vulnerability, a financial shock in the past twelve months raises the odds for 
severity of economic debt by 1.9 and produces a modest reduction in the impact of economic 
vulnerability from 24.5 to 23.0. It increases the Nagelkerke R
2   from 0.329 to 0.341. The 
financial shock variable clearly has a significant effect but it must be viewed as modest when 
viewed in the context of the economic vulnerability effect. 
Table 10: Ordered Logit of Severity of Debt on Economic Vulnerability and Income Shock 
  (i)  (ii) 
  Odds Ratio  Odds Ratio 
Economic 
Vulnerability 
24.53  23.011*** 
Income Shock    1.902*** 
Reduction in Log 
Likelihood 
1,537.318  1,604.595 
Degrees of freedom  1  2 
Nagelkerke    R
2  0.329  0.341 
N  4,415  4,415 
*** P < ,001 * P< ,01 
 
Severity of Debt Problems, Socio-economic Differentiation and Economic 
Vulnerability 
Our  analysis  to  date  has  shown  that  the  indicators  that  have  been  employed  in  previous 
analysis of poverty and social exclusion in Ireland, comprising ‘at risk of income poverty’, 
consistent  poverty  and  economic  vulnerability,  all  succeed  in  identifying  groups  that  are 
sharply differentiated in terms of the severity of the debt problems they experience. However, 
it  was  clear  that  the  discriminatory  power  of  the  economic  vulnerability  variable  was 
substantially greater. In this section we seek to develop our interpretation of the strength of 23 
 
this relationship by introducing a range of variables that might be expected to impact on the 
relationship. 
Our analysis, which is set out in Table 11, proceeds as follows. Taking the four category of 
severity of debt classification as our dependent variable we enter a range of socio-economic 
characteristics  of  the  Household  Reference  Person  and  financial  circumstances  of  the 
household as independent variables in an ordered logistic regression. Our interest is not so 
much in the net effect of such variables but in their cumulative predictive power in relation to 
severity of debt problems. However, it is clear that each of the variables has a significant 
independent effect. Looking at first to the results from the first model (i), thus the odds ratio 
for the unemployed is 1.7. For divorce it is also 1.7 and for a lone parent 2.0. For those 
without  educational  qualifications  it  is  2.1.  Households  with  younger  HRPs  have  higher 
levels  of  risk  and  for  those  where  the  HRP  is  less  than  30  the  odds  ratio  is  2.8.  Not 
surprisingly low income households are more likely to report more severe problems and the 
odds ratio for the bottom quintile reaches 5.5. Both, the 11-item basic deprivation and 18-
item consumption deprivation scales are strongly related to debt variable. Finally, both the 
income  shock  variable  and  that  relating  to  the  expectation  of  deteriorating  economic 








Table 11: Ordered Logits of Severity of Debt on Socio-Economic Factors  
  (i)  (ii)  (iii) 
HRP Labour Force Status       
Farmer            0.674**  0.743*  0.729* 
Unemployed          1.670***      1.565***   1.459** 
Ill/Disabled         1.522***  1.438*  1.447* 
Retired            0.723*  0.764*  0.795* 
HRP Marital Status       
Widowed        1.718***      1.682***      1.733*** 
Single            1.242**          1.175*  1.256* 
Separated       1.570***     1.481**       1.499*** 
Divorced      1.680***      1.680**       1.429*** 
Tenure       
Owned Outright          0.457***               0.470***        0.448*** 
HRP Lone Parent      2.011***       1.793***      1.690** 
One Person Household     0.726***      0.742**     0.726** 
HRP Education       
No Qualifications    2.064***     1.592***      1.645*** 
Intermediate Certificate   1.779***     1.500***          1.656*** 
Leaving Certificate  1.423***  1.280*      1.332*** 
HRP Age       
< 30   2.768***       2.869***       2.896*** 
30-49    1.537***      1.531**      1.537*** 
50-64    1.321***   1.280*       1.361*** 
Income Quintile       
First    5.485***       5.254***     3.743*** 
Second    5.109***       4.591***     3.789*** 
Third    3.869***       3.673***    3.370*** 
Fourth    1.974***       1.847***     1.670*** 
       
Basic Deprivation  1.639***       1.582***    1.279*** 
Consumption Deprivation  1.196***        1.179***   1.174*** 
Major drop of income in the past 12 
months 
2.117***       2.171***  1.984** 
Expect financial situation to be 
worse in the next 12 months 
1.361***      1.379***     1.307*** 
Having a bank account        0.629***   0.634*** 
 Having a loan             2.367***  2.307** 
Having a credit card            0.593***  0.513*** 
Economic vulnerability       3.277*** 
Economic Vulnerability*Having a 
credit card 
    2.591*** 
Nagelkerke R
2   0.510  0.537  0.556 
Reduction in likelihood ratio  2,645.5  2,838,1  2,977.949 
Degrees of freedom  25  28  29 
N  4,338  4,338  4,338 





The overall set of variables produces a reduction on the log likelihood ratio of 2,645.5 for 25 
degrees of freedom and a Nagelkerke R
2 of 0.510. Clearly, severity of debt is structured in 
socio-economic terms in a highly predictable fashion. It should be noted that we have not 
included  the  subjective  economic  stress  variable  in  this  equation.  Adding  the  financial 
inclusion variables relating to possessing a bank account and a credit card and the variable 
relating  to  having  a  loan  reduces  the  log  likelihood  ratio  by  192.6  and  increases  the 
Nagelkerke  R
2  to  0.537.  Thus  the  financial  inclusion  variables  increase  our  explanatory 
power  but  the  increase  is  of  a  modest  scale.  In  the  final  equation  we  add  the  economic 
vulnerability  variable  and  allow  for  the  interaction  between  economic  vulnerability  and 
having a credit card. In other words we allow for the possibility that the impact of having a 
credit card may be different between the vulnerable and non-vulnerable. The addition of these 
two terms produces a reduction in the log likelihood ratio of 139 for 29 degrees of freedom 
and increases the R
2 to 0.556.  
The interaction between having a credit card and economic vulnerability does prove to be 
significant.  If  we  take  the  group  who  are  not  economically  vulnerable  as  the  reference 
category in calculating the net effects and assign it a value of 1 we find that possession of a 
credit  card  reduces  the  odds  on  severity  of  debt  problems  by  0.513.  For  those  who  are 
economically vulnerable having a credit card raises the odds on severity of debt problems by 
1.338. Thus the relative net odds go from 1 for the non-vulnerable without a credit care to 
0.513 for with a card. It then rises to 3.277 for the vulnerable without credit cards before 
peaking at 4.287 for the vulnerable possessing cards. Thus the consequences of having a 
credit card is crucially dependent on vulnerability and the impact of the latter is to some 
extent dependent on possession of the former. For those without credit cards vulnerability 26 
 
raises the odds on severity of debt problems by 3.227 while among those with a credit card 
this  figure  rises  to  8.357  (4.287/0.513).    These  net  effects  differ  from  the  gross  effects 
reported in Table 9. They suggest that the gross positive effect reported for possession of 
credit cards by the economically vulnerable group is a consequence not of the possession of a 
credit card per se but of the fact that such possession is associated with the range of socio-
economic factors for which we control in Table 11  
The net effect of having a bank account is positive for both vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
groups. The interaction effect reported for credit card possession  provides evidence that, 
having taken into account a range of socio-economic factors, the experience of debt problems 
may be exacerbated among the economically vulnerable by availability of credit card debt. 
However, an alternative interpretation is that such availability reflects unmeasured factors 
additional to those included in our analysis reflecting superior economic resources among the 
non-vulnerable but additional economic pressures among the vulnerable. Thus the relative 
importance of chronic and acute stressors remains an open question. It is also important to 
keep in mind that only 20 per cent of the vulnerable class have credit cards compared to 60 
per cent of the non-vulnerable. 
Notwithstanding the above interaction, it is important to note that the introduction of the HRP 
socio-demographic variables and household financial circumstances factors accounts for 95 
per cent of the average explanatory power of the economic vulnerability variable. Introducing 
the subjective economic stress variables this figure rises to close to 100 per cent.  
Turning our focus to a consideration of economic vulnerability as a dependent variable, we 
find that the set of HRP socio-economic characteristics and household attributes in equation 
(i) produce a Nagelkerke R
2 of 0.796 when regressed on economic vulnerability. Adding the 
financial  inclusion  variables  produces  no  further  increase.  However,  the  addition  of  the 27 
 
measure  of  current  subjective  economic  stress  produces  a  further  increase  to  0.901.  The 
ability  of  the  economic  vulnerability  variable  to  differentiate  households  in  terms  of  the 
severity of their debt problems is largely accounted for by the fact that it acts as a proxy for a 
weighted set of socio-economic circumstances that in turn are powerful predictors of severity 
of economic stress. Accounting for its average explanatory power requires relatively little 
reference  to  additional  independent  effects  of  financial  exclusion  indicators  or  personal 
coping capacities. The evidence for a degree of interaction between economic vulnerability 
and possession of a credit card could reflect the impact of the latter although that is by no 
means the only possible explanation. 
Our analysis provides additional support for conceptualising and measuring social exclusion 




In this paper, taking Ireland as a test case, we have sought to understand the extent to which 
measures  currently  employed  as  indicators  of  poverty  and  social  exclusion  succeed  in 
capturing over-indebtedness and, more broadly, severity of debt problems. Our decision to 
extend our analysis beyond over-indebtedness as such was due to the clear evidence of the 
substantial  role  of  socio-economic  factors  in  structuring  a  broader  continuum  of  debt 
problems. 
 Our  analysis  reveals  that  there  is  a  clear  gradient  in  terms  of  capacity  to  identify  such 
problems with predictive ability increasing sharply as one moves from ‘at risk of poverty’ to 
consistent poverty and finally economic vulnerability. The key distinction between the 18 per 
cent of households defined as economically vulnerable and all others. 28 
 
Further  analysis  confirmed  that  it  was  economic  vulnerability  characterised  by  a  multi-
dimensional profile relating to heighted risk in relation to income poverty, basic deprivation 
and subjective economic stress rather than simply current exposure to economic stress that is 
crucial. 
Financial  exclusion  relating  to  access  to  a  bank  account  and  a  credit  card  was  found  to 
increase debt levels. However, the effect was rather modest when viewed in the context of the 
substantial  effects  associated  with  economic  vulnerability.  Having  a  bank  account  had  a 
positive  effect  for  both  vulnerable  and  non-vulnerable  groups  both  before  and  after 
controlling for a range of socio-economic factors. For the non-vulnerable this is also true in 
relation to possession of a credit card but for the non-vulnerable group the original positive 
effect is reversed when controls are introduced. 
 
While the net effect was modest, the relationship between access to a bank current account 
and less severe debt problems suggests that access to basic financial services of this sort can 
assist households to manage income and payments, although the current data do not provide 
details  on  the  precise  type  of  banking  services  that  would  be  most  useful  to  vulnerable 
households. The manner in which economic vulnerability succeeds in differentiating between 
levels of severity of debt problems seems to be largely a consequence of its relationship to a 
wide range of socio-economic attributes and socio-economic circumstances. However, the net 
impact of economic vulnerability on severity of debt problems controlling for a range of 
socio-economic factors is exacerbated for those with access to credit card facilities.  
Exposure  to  income  shocks  and  concerns  about  further  deterioration  in  financial 
circumstances are features of this wider vulnerability. However, the relatively modest role of 29 
 
such acute stressor needs to be viewed in the context of enduring levels of more chronic 
financial pressures to which economically vulnerable households are subjected. 
It may still be the case that personal characteristics and income, various aspects of money 
management are associated with the risk of over-indebtedness and interaction with economic 
vulnerability may  provide one  channel of influence.   McCarthy  (2010) argues that while 
demographic  and  economic  variables  are  important,  behavioural  characteristics  like  an 
individual’s capacity for self control, planning and patience are both statistically significant 
and economically important for predicting ‘financial distress’. Similarly, in the UK, Berthoud 
and Kempson (1992) found that those who placed high importance on making payments, 
even if this meant going without other things, were much less likely to have problems with 
debt. In addition the absence of savings has been found to be related to heightened levels of 
being in arrears (Berthoud and Kempson 1992).  
As with most complex social phenomena, there is unlikely to be a single simple cause of 
over-indebtedness (Davydoff et al 2008). Bradshaw and Finch (2003) suggest that it is useful 
to distinguish between risk factors which signal the vulnerability of a category of households 
or  individuals  and  triggers  which  translate  such  propensities  into  actual  outcomes.  Risk 
factors  (such  as  low  income,  unemployment,  absence  of  educational  qualifications,  lone 
parenthood)  will  work  in  combination  with  each  other  and  with  triggers  (changes  in 
circumstances)  to  lead  to  over-indebtedness,  while  poor  money  management,  over-
commitment and financial exclusion may compound the problems being faced.  
While the latter factors  may play  a role in helping us to understand the micro-processes 
through which economically vulnerable households become exposed to severe debt problems 
we  could  find  little  evidence  that  they  play  an  important  role  in  mediating  economic 
vulnerability  in  a  manner  that  is  independent  of  the  socio-economic  circumstances  of 30 
 
households. A lack of savings appears to be indicative of diminished resources rather than 
poor financial management. The significance of financial management is critically related to 
the  level  of  available  resources.  As  Atkinson  (2006:20)  notes,  day-to-day  money 
management is of prime importance for households who do not have the wherewithal to 
engage in long-term financial planning and  are disassociated from the  world of financial 
services.  For  well  endowed  households  the  consequences  of  inappropriate  money 
management are a good deal less drastic.
3 
This  is  not  to  say  that  “over-  borrowing”  or  reckless-lending  might  not  become  a  more 
common  source  of  over-indebtedness  as  the  economic  recession  persists.  The  EU  SILC 
module  on  over-indebtedness  was  carried  out  in  2008  early  on  in  the  current  recession. 
Households with a high level of credit, particularly mortgage credit may be at risk of over-
indebtedness due to income loss caused by unemployment and pay cuts. This is particularly 
true  if  loss  of  income  becomes  more  permanent  through  long  term  unemployment  or 
inactivity, which will mean that resources, insurance and savings are depleted. The level of 
long term unemployment has increased significantly since 2008, from 1.5% to 5.9% in the 
second quarter of 2010. Almost half of unemployed men (49%) and one third of unemployed 
women are now long term unemployed (49%) (CSO, 2010). Combined with significant cuts 
in pay and rises in tax levels since the survey in 2008 there is likely to have been a significant 
increase in over-indebtedness in 2009 and 2010, however the data is not available to conduct 
this analysis as the special module was only fielded in 2008 
While these problems may become more widespread than in the past, our analysis suggests 
that those drawn into the debt net will come from an enlarged set of economically vulnerable 
households.  The  scale  of  debt  problems  may  be  substantially  greater  than  heretofore. 
However, the composition of those households affected is almost certain to reflect the impact 
of the socio-economic factors that we have shown to be crucial in predicting both economic 31 
 
vulnerability and severity of debt problems. However, the scale of mortgage debt is likely to 
mean that life-cycle stage is likely to play an increasing important role although in interaction 
with rather than independently of other socio-economic characteristics. The manner in which 
a  potential  debt  crisis  unfolds  will  be  and  be  shaped  by  the  broader  socio-economic 
structuring of life-chances. Any attempt to respond to such problems by concentrating on 
household behaviour or, indeed, triggering factors without taking the wider context of social 







                                                 
1 It is worth noting that households may become over-indebted without any access to sanctioned credits as they 
run up debt on utility bills, mortgages or rent etc. 
 
2Caution must be exercised with these figures as there are only 74 households who were both over-indebted and 
had experienced an income shock.  
3 For those attracted to ‘behavioural’ explanations it is salutary to note that while being a local authority tenant 
household had a significant impact on severity of debt problems, its net effect when controlling for other socio-
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